



Col·lecció d’Economia E21/408 








UB Economics Working Paper No. 408 
Title: Segregation and preferences for redistribution 
Abstract: We study the relationship between segregation and preferences for redistribution in 
Europe. We measure segregation as the incidence of assortative mating in terms of education 
and occupation. Assortative mating is measured at the regional level for 10 European countries 
using the IPUMS data. We combine these data with eight waves of the European Social Survey 
(2002-2016). We find that increased socioeconomic segregation in most forms of assortative 
mating leads affluent individuals to support less redistribution. Results suggest that affluent 
individuals are less socially attached when there are high levels of segregation. 
JEL Codes: D31, D63, Z13 
Keywords: Segregation, assortative mating, preferences for redistribution, European regions  
Authors: 
Dilara Tosu 
Universitat de Girona 
Montserrat Vilalta-Bufí 
Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT, CREB 
 
Email: dilaratosu@gmail.com Email: mmontsevilalta@ub.edu  
   
Date: March 2021 
Acknowledgements: We are grateful to Elena del Rey, Javier Olivera and Angel Solano-
García for helpful comments and suggestions. Montserrat Vilalta-Bufí gratefully 
acknowledges financial support from the Spanish government through the grant RTI2018-
093543-B-I00, MCIU/AEI/FEDER, UE. 
1 Introduction
Over the last decades, income inequality has increased significantly in many
industrialized countries while redistribution has remained stable or decreased
in most countries (OECD, 2016). This contradicts the seminal Meltzer and
Richard (1981) model, which predicts that an increase in income inequality is
positively related to a higher demand for income redistribution in the country.
In their model, individuals’ only concern is to maximize their after-tax income
where the redistribution rate is determined by a majority voting rule. The
empirical literature finds mixed results about the relationship between pre-
tax income inequality and redistribution. As Alesina and Giuliano (2011)
state, the lack of empirical consensus suggests that there are other relevant
determinants of preferences for redistribution apart from individual’s income.
Several papers have contributed to this literature by extending the analysis
along multiple dimensions (see the next section for a literature review). In
this paper, we explore the role of segregation in explaining preferences for
redistribution.
At least two theories predict a negative effect of segregation on the pref-
erences for redistribution. On the one hand, Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2003)
show that residential income segregation might arise as a consequence of
high income inequality. Moreover, they argue that segregation may reduce
the social attachment of the rich with other groups in the society, which
reduces their willingness to share their prosperity with the poor. In this
case, segregation reduces the preference for redistribution of the affluent. On
the other hand, Windsteiger (2017) shows in a model that in the presence
of segregation, individuals may perceive a lower level of inequality than the
actual level. This misperception of inequality leads people to support less
redistributive policies. The latter mechanism applies to all individuals in the
society.
We empirically estimate how preferences for redistribution are affected
by segregation in the society. If segregation only affects negatively the pref-
erences of the affluent, our results will support the social attachment mech-
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anism of Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2003), while a general negative effect of
segregation for all individuals will point towards the mechanism of less per-
ceived inequality proposed by Windsteiger (2017).
We use assortative mating as a measurement for social segregation in a
region (see Schwartz, 2013, for a review of the literature on assortative mat-
ing). Assortative mating might be the result of residential segregation, which
reduces the likelihood that individuals from different backgrounds meet, or
due to differences in lifestyles and preferences of different social groups. Both
cases imply little interaction between different groups in the society, which
leads to real social segregation. Bruch and Mare (2009) explain how assor-
tative mating in race, educational attainment, social class background, and
religion act as segregation processes in the society. We follow Greenwood
et al. (2014) to compute assortative mating in each region. We exploit the
data for socio-economic status of spouses from the IPUMS (Integrated Pub-
lic Use Microdata Series, Minnesota Population Center (2019)) to calculate
first the fraction of couples with the same education level for each region
as the actual matching; then we compute the fraction of both partners that
would have the same education level by random matching using contingency
tables. The ratio of the actual to random matches yields the values for edu-
cation assortative mating. We compute analogously an alternative measure
of assortative mating based on individual’s occupation.
We investigate the relationship between differences in the incidence of as-
sortative mating and individuals’ attitudes to redistribution on a sub-national
scale. We use the individual attitudinal data from the biannual 2002-2016
waves of the European Social Survey (ESS) (2018) for 111 regions in 10 differ-
ent European countries. Many papers study different aspects of educational
assortative mating (Blossfeld, 2009; Skopek et al., 2010; Smits et al., 1998;
Stevens, 1991) as well as assortative mating by occupation (Hout, 1982). As
far as we know we are the first to study the effect of assortative mating on
preferences for redistribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a lit-
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erature review on inequality and preferences for redistribution. Section 3
explains the data and methodology used. Results are presented in Section 4.
We conclude in Section 5.
2 Literature Review
A large body of literature in political economics discusses the relationship
between income inequality and redistributive preferences. In the seminal
Meltzer and Richard (1981) model, there is a positive relationship between in-
come inequality and the demand for income redistribution in a given country.
Several authors confirm this positive effect of inequality on preferences for
redistribution (see, e.g., Borge and Rattsø, 2004; Finseraas, 2009; Karabar-
bounis, 2011; Milanovic, 2000; Olivera, 2015). Olivera (2015) finds that vari-
ations in income inequality are positively related to variations in preferences
for redistribution over time. Nevertheless, Georgiadis and Manning (2012)
identify a negative relationship. They find that the demand for redistribution
declines in the UK while income inequality increases. Moreover, in several
studies no significant association was found (e.g., Gouveia and Masia, 1998;
Kenworthy and McCall, 2007; Scervini, 2012). Alesina et al. (2004) also find
that income distribution is not a significant determinant of redistribution.
Several studies provide alternative explanations about the relationship
between inequality and preferences for redistribution. The prospect of up-
ward mobility (POUM) hypothesis, for instance, states that when individuals
expect to experience upward mobility in the society, they prefer less redis-
tribution even if there is high inequality (Benabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina
et al., 2018). Corneo and Grüner (2000) add two alternative mechanisms
to the Meltzer and Richard (1981) model. First, they pose that individuals
have preferences for redistribution independent of their income level. Sec-
ond, they argue that individuals care about the effect of redistribution on
their close social circle. They find support for both mechanisms. Some other
papers highlight the difference between actual inequality and perceived in-
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equality. People tend to underestimate income inequality or their position
in the income distribution (Cruces et al., 2013; Karadja et al., 2017; Norton
and Ariely, 2011; Norton et al., 2014).
A strand of the political economics literature studies the impact of indi-
vidual characteristics on preferences for redistribution. Iversen and Soskice
(2001) find that individuals who have made risky investments in skills are
less mobile than general, portable workers. Therefore, they may face an
unemployment period or even suffer from a future income loss. To pro-
tect themselves from these risks, they are more prone to support government
spending. The authors also add that union members, female individuals, and
the elderly have strong incentives to support government spending. In con-
trast, self-employed individuals, better-informed individuals, and individuals
who support right-wing parties are more likely to oppose social protection.
White people are more prone to be against redistribution than black peo-
ple (see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005). Individuals who live in rural areas,
as well as married individuals tend to support more redistribution (Raval-
lion and Lokshin, 2000). Cusack et al. (2006) find that publicly employed
workers compared to private-sector workers, students and retired individuals
are also more likely to embrace redistribution. The possibility of becom-
ing unemployed plays a significant role on the preferences for redistribution
(see Fernández-Albertos and Manzano, 2016). Rehm (2011) calculates the
unemployment risk within a categorized occupation and its relation with
preferences for redistribution. If the occupational unemployment risk in-
creases then workers with a high risk of unemployment are more likely to
approve government spending. Rehm (2011) also finds that better-off indi-
viduals in terms of income and higher educated individuals are more likely
to disapprove redistribution policies.
Individuals’ beliefs in effort and luck also affect the preferences for govern-
ment spending. Alesina and Angeletos (2005) find that if a society believes
that effort is an important determinant of income then they tend to demand
low levels of redistribution, whereas if luck, family connections, or corrup-
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tion are believed to be more important to determine income, then they tend
to support redistributive policies. Fong (2001) shows that individuals tend
to be in favor of redistribution if they believe that the main determinant of
poverty is exogenous. The political ideology is also a significant determinant
of preferences for redistribution (see Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Alesina
et al. (2018) find that left-wing individuals support redistributive taxation.
Moreover, those who are pessimistic about intergenerational mobility support
even more redistribution.
Another line of research shows that culture is an important determinant
for redistribution preferences. Luttmer and Singhal (2011) show that the
attitude towards redistribution of immigrants depends on the redistribution
policy in their country of birth. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) find
that individuals from former East Germany are more likely to have pro-
redistribution attitudes than individuals from West Germans after reunifica-
tion. Corneo and Grüner (2002) show that individuals from former socialist
countries tend to demand stronger preferences for reducing economic inequal-
ity than those from Western nations.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data
We study preferences for redistribution using data from eight waves of the
European Social Survey (ESS) which were carried out biannually from 2002
to 2016. The survey includes questions about individuals’ attitudes towards
redistribution as well as individual characteristics. It is widely used in the
welfare state literature.1 Individual’s preference for redistribution is mea-
sured as the individual’s support to this statement: ”The government should
take measures to reduce differences in income levels”. The respondents’ an-
swers vary on a scale from 1 to 5: disagree strongly (1), disagree (2), neither
1see Olivera (2015), Senik et al. (2009), Luttmer and Singhal (2011).
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agree nor disagree (3), agree(4), agree strongly (5).
We pool the eight waves of the ESS data and combine them with our
regional measures of assortative mating. Our cross-sectional data of indi-
vidual attitudes covers individuals in 111 regions of 10 European countries:
Austria (AT), Italy (IT), Poland (PL), Spain (ES), France (FR), Switzer-
land (CH), Portugal (PT), Ireland (IE), Slovenia (SI) and Greece (EL). Our
sample includes only individuals between 18 and 65 years old. The final
sample size is 68,341 observations without missing information. The number
of observations per region is 615 on average, ranging between 35 to 3,297
observations.
We add regional controls at the NUTS 2 level from several databases.
The regional unemployment rate (population aged 15-74 years) and the per-
centage of tertiary educational attainment level (population aged 25-64) for
the year 2001 are retrieved from Eurostat (Eurostat (2019)); regional gini in-
dex before taxes is from OECD (OECD Data (2019a)): France, Switzerland,
Ireland, Slovenia and Portugal for 2010; Austria, Greece, Italy, Poland, and
Spain for the year 2013.2 Finally, regional GDP per capita for the year 2001
is also from OECD (OECD Data (2019b)).
Table 1 provides the summary statistics of the preferences for redistribu-
tion, individual characteristics, and regional and political ideology variables.
The demand for redistribution is high on average (4 out of 5 points). Most
of the sample is native and around 63% have a partner. The average indi-
vidual is 42 years old and lives in a household with three members. 30% of
the sample has tertiary education and around 60% of the population in the
sample are employed. Moreover, almost 52% of the people live in a village or
a small city and the rest lives in a big city or the suburbs of big cities. The
majority of individuals agree that they live comfortably or at least they are
coping with their current income. However, 22% of them believe that they
have difficulties living with their current income. An average individual has
2Note that we could not find Gini data for Ireland, Portugal, Greece, and Poland at
the NUTS 2 level,so we use the data for these countries at the NUTS 1 level.
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a centrist political attitude (5 out of 10 points).
We use the IPUMS data to compute the measure of assortative mating
at the regional level (NUTS 2 level). We consider married and cohabiting
couples among individuals between 25 and 59 years old. We follow the pa-
per Greenwood et al. (2014) to calculate the incidence of assortative mating
in the region. First, the fraction of couples with the same education level
for each region is computed as the actual matching. Secondly, we create a
contingency table where the diagonal contains the randomly matched cou-
ples where both partners have the same education level. The sum along the
diagonal defines the random matching. The ratio of the actual to random
matches yields the values for assortative mating by educational status. We
proceed analogously to compute assortative mating in terms of occupation.
The lowest level of assortative mating is 1 when the actual matching co-
incides with the random matching. The higher is assortative mating, the
more couples sort according to their education or occupation level. We use
this measure as a proxy for regional socioeconomic segregation. We use the
countries where the information on the socio-economic status of the partner
is available in the IPUMS data. We compute the assortative mating in the
regions at the NUTS 2 level for these countries: Austria, Greece, Italy, Spain,
and Portugal in the year 2001; for Ireland, Poland and Slovenia in 2002; for
France in 2006; and lastly for Switzerland in 2000. The sample size of the
regions in the IPUMS data ranges from 1,959 to around 1 million couples,
with an average of 61 thousand couples per region.
To calculate assortative mating by educational status, we classify the
education level in four categories: less than primary level of education com-
pleted; primary level of education completed; secondary level of education
completed; and university level education completed. We also compute as-
sortative mating in terms of occupational status. We use the classification of
occupations based on skill levels. ISCO-08 describes four levels of aggrega-
tion which is listed in Table 2. Managers and Professionals (ISCO-08 major
groups 1 and 2) are considered to be at the highest skill level 4. Techni-
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max
Preferences for Redistribution 3.975 0.989 1 5
Native-born 0.904 0.294 0 1
Living with partner 0.630 0.483 0 1
Male 0.480 0.500 0 1
Age 42.225 13.254 18 65
Household size 3.043 1.415 1 15
Primary Education 0.296 0.457 0 1
Secondary Education 0.413 0.492 0 1
Tertiary Education 0.291 0.454 0 1
Employed 0.634 0.482 0 1
Student 0.071 0.257 0 1
Unemployed 0.075 0.264 0 1
Retired 0.089 0.285 0 1
Other 0.124 0.330 0 1
Big city 0.203 0.402 0 1
Suburbs of big city 0.271 0.444 0 1
Small city 0.113 0.317 0 1
Village 0.413 0.492 0 1
Living in comfort on present income 0.296 0.456 0 1
Coping on present income 0.477 0.499 0 1
Difficult on present income 0.227 0.419 0 1
Political Ideology 4.889 2.138 0 10
Unemployment Rate 8.878 5.921 1.8 25
Tertiary Educ. Attainment 19.082 8.883 5 44
Gini before taxes 0.487 0.050 0.370 0.576
Gdp per capita 32161.045 13265.155 10512 68328
N 68341
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3 Technicians and Associate Professionals 3
4 Clerks 2
5 Services and Sales Workers 2
6 Skilled Agricultural and Fishery Workers 2
7 Craft and Related Trades Workers 2
8 Plant and Machine Operators, and Assemblers 2
9 Elementary Occupations 1
Source: Adaptation of Table 1 from International Labour Office (ILO) (2012).
Available at www.ilo.org
cians and Associate Professionals (ISCO-08 major group 3) belongs to the
medium-high skill level 3. ISCO-08 major groups 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 include
occupations at the same medium -low skill level 2. Elementary occupations
(ISCO-08 major group 9) comprises occupations at the lowest skill level 1.
We exclude armed forces from the analysis.
In a further analysis, we compute alternative measures of assortative mat-
ing. First, we classify education levels in two categories only: less than pri-
mary level of education completed, and at least primary level completed.
This index of assortative mating measures segregation of the bottom group
of individuals in terms of education. Similarly, we classify education in less
than tertiary education and tertiary education level, to measure segregation
of the top group of individuals in education terms. We do similarly with
occupation levels. In this case, the top occupations are the managers and
professionals (ISCO-08 codes 1 and 2) whereas the occupations at the bottom
are the elementary occupations (ISCO-08 code 9).
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics of the assortative mating variables
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used in the analysis. These measures are also represented in Figures 1 to 6.
Assortative mating by education ranges from 1.08 to 2.12; assortative mating
by occupation ranges between 1.20 and 1.61. The level of assortative mating
decreases when we use extreme segregation measures (less than primary ed-
ucation, tertiary degree, top and bottom occupations). In general, there is
significant heterogeneity of assortative mating within countries as it can be
seen from Figures 1 to 6. Portugal and Greece have large values for education
assortative mating, while Switzerland and Slovenia have low values.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Assortative Mating Variables
mean sd min max
Assortative Mating by Education 1.513 0.260 1.082 2.124
Assortative Mating by Occupation 1.385 0.083 1.201 1.609
Assortative Mating by Less than Primary 1.086 0.155 1.000 1.560
Assortative Mating by Tertiary Degree 1.134 0.083 1.034 1.496
Assortative Mating by Top Occupations 1.188 0.060 1.082 1.302
Assortative Mating by Bottom Occupations 1.129 0.067 1.045 1.404
The first column in Table 4 shows the correlations between the assortative
mating measures and inequality measured as the Gini coefficient before taxes.
Assortative mating is positively correlated with inequality as expected. A
Table 4: Correlations between Inequality and Assortative Mating













AM by Education 0.5050 1.0000
AM by Tertiary Degree 0.0440 0.4329 1.0000
AM by Less than Primary 0.2980 0.5161 -0.0285 1.0000
AM by Occupation 0.2640 0.4664 0.2018 0.0538 1.0000
AM by Top Occ. 0.1843 0.5258 0.0870 0.0506 0.8424 1.0000
AM by Bottom Occ. 0.4643 0.3480 -0.2415 0.7071 0.0173 -0.1415
AM: Assortative mating
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Figure 1: Assortative Mating by Educational Status
(1.638241,2.124198] (1.543118,1.638241] (1.47474,1.543118] [1.082004,1.47474] No data
Figure 2: Assortative Mating by Occupational Status
(1.431484,1.608548] (1.375829,1.431484] (1.32752,1.375829] [1.194145,1.32752] No data
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Figure 3: Assortative Mating by Less than Primary Degree
(1.064453,1.559993] (1.022105,1.064453] (1.001493,1.022105] [1,1.001493] No data
Figure 4: Assortative Mating by Tertiary Degree
(1.188357,1.496321] (1.12507,1.188357] (1.073225,1.12507] [1.034012,1.073225] No data
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Figure 5: Assortative Mating by Top Occupations
(1.222842,1.301853] (1.164264,1.222842] (1.121979,1.164264] [1.081877,1.121979] No data
Figure 6: Assortative Mating by Bottom Occupations
(1.167071,1.404387] (1.134919,1.167071] (1.095066,1.134919] [1.046219,1.095066] No data
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segregated society is likely to have high inequality, and an unequal society
is likely to get segregated as discussed in the introduction. Columns (2)
to (6) show the correlation between different measures of assortative mating.
Assortative mating by education and by occupation are positively correlated,
although the correlation is far from perfect. Assortative mating by education
is driven by both, segregation at the top and at the bottom as the correlation
shows. Assortative mating by occupation is largely reflecting segregation of
the affluent (those in top occupations). The measures of assortative mating at
the top and at the bottom level are negatively correlated. This suggests that
segregation tends to occur either at the top or the bottom of the distribution,
rather that both at once, specially for occupation assortative mating.
3.2 Econometric specification
We estimate an OLS regression where the dependent variable yinct measures
the preferences for redistribution of an individual i living in region n of
country c, at survey round t. We estimate the following specification for
each dimension of assortative mating.
yinct = βAMn +Xitδ + Znγ + αc + µt + εinct.
AMn is the measure of assortative mating of region n. The vector Xit
contains the individuals’ characteristics such as age, age squared, gender,
partnership status, nativity, highest level of education, main activity in the
last seven days (before the interview), the number of people living in the
household, the area where respondent’s live (big city, suburbs, small city,
village), a subjective evaluation of household income (living comfortably,
coping, difficult or very difficult to live on present income), and the political
ideology of the respondent (0-left, 10-right). All the individual character-
istics are from the ESS. The vector Zn controls for regional characteristics,
which consists of the regional unemployment rate, the percentage of tertiary
educational attainment level, the Gini index, and regional GDP per capita.
We include country and year dummies to capture country (αc) and year
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fixed effects (µt) which are highly significant for all specifications. Finally,
εint is the error term. We cluster the standard errors at the regional level.
All observations are weighted in accordance with the design weights and the
population size weights from the European Social Survey.
The main variable of interest is the incidence of assortative mating, which
is used as a measure of segregation of the society. Segregation through mat-
ing is expected to have a negative effect on the preferences for redistribution
as discussed in the introduction. We first estimate the equation for the whole
sample. Then we distinguish three sub-samples according to the subjective
income level of individuals: those that report living comfortably on present
income, those that report coping on present income, and those that report
that they have difficulties living on present income.3 A negative effect of
assortative mating on preferences for redistribution in all sub-samples would
provide support for the mechanism proposed in Windsteiger (2017), while a
negative effect only for the affluent sample would provide support for Bjor-
vatn and Cappelen (2003)’s theory.
4 Results
4.1 Main results
We analyze the effect of segregation, measured as the incidence of assorta-
tive mating, on preferences for redistribution. In Table 5, we estimate how
assortative mating in terms of education affects an individual’s support for
redistribution. The first column reports the result for the whole sample,
while columns (2) to (4) report the results for three sub-samples based on
3We use the subjective income evaluation to have comparable values across waves. An
alternative would be to use the reported income deciles. However, the classification of
income deciles in rounds 1-3 of the ESS data set is different from the classification in the
rounds 4 to 8, and it is not possible to combine them. Not to lose observations, we decided
to divide the sample according to respondents’ subjective evaluation of income instead of
income deciles. Both measures are strongly correlated (Correlation is 0.52).
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subjective income. Column 2 refers to the sample of those that report liv-
ing comfortably with current income, column 3 refers to those who consider
that they are coping on present income, and column 4 refers to those who
have difficulties with their present income. Each column includes country
and year fixed effects, regional controls, basic-individual characteristics, and
a political-ideology control variable.
Results reveal that segregation affects negatively preferences for redistri-
bution only for those individuals who live comfortably on present income.
The coefficient for the whole sample is negative but not statistically signifi-
cant. Once we distinguish between different income level groups, the effect
of assortative mating on preferences for redistribution becomes negative and
significant for the affluent group, while it has no significant effect for the
rest. Table 6 shows similar results when segregation is measured as assorta-
tive mating by occupation. The more couples with the same occupation are
in the region, the less support for redistribution is given by individuals who
live comfortably with their income.
These results suggest that the effect of segregation on attitudes towards
redistribution is negative for the wealthier individuals only. This is consistent
with the theory where the wealthy may be less willing to redistribute due to
their lower social attachment in the presence of high segregation (Bjorvatn
and Cappelen, 2003).
Tables 7 and 8 report the effects of extreme segregation at the top and
the bottom of the society in terms of education and occupation levels, re-
spectively. In the upper panel of Table 7, we measure assortative mating in
terms of having less than a primary education degree.4 In the lower panel,
assortative mating is measured by having a completed tertiary degree. In
the former case, we find that segregation of those at the bottom in terms of
education has a negative effect for the whole sample. This result is driven
by the group of wealthy individuals, as the coefficient of assortative mating
4In this estimation, Austria and Ireland are not included because all individuals com-
pleted at least a primary degree education in these countries.
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Table 5: Assortative Mating by Educational Status and Support for Redis-
tribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All sample Living comfortably Coping on Difficulties with
on present income present income present income
Assortative Mating -0.006 -0.396** 0.047 0.170
by Educational Status (0.176) (0.195) (0.236) (0.162)
N 68341 20220 32622 15499
adj. R2 0.084 0.113 0.053 0.035
Country and year FE yes yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes yes
Individual controls yes yes yes yes
Ideology controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: OLS estimation. The dependent variable depends on the answers to this survey
question: Should the government take measures to reduce differences in income levels? We
use eight ESS rounds from 2002 to 2016. The independent variable is assortative mating in
terms of education at the regional level (for its computation IPUMS dataset is used). The
first column includes the whole sample, column 2 includes the group of individuals who live
comfortably on their present income, column 3 includes individuals who cope with their
present income and lastly, column 4 includes individuals who have difficulties with their
present income. Regional controls contain the unemployment rate and the percentage of
tertiary educational attainment level for the year 2001 from Eurostat; Gini before tax and
transfers (France, Switzerland, Ireland, Slovenia and Portugal for 2010; Austria, Greece,
Italy, Poland, and Spain for the year 2013) and GDP per capita for the year 2001 (source
OECD). Individual controls include nativity status, partnership status, gender, age, age
squared, education level, the size of household, activity status before interview-i.e., being
unemployed, student, retired..etc, individual’s domicile-e.g., living in a big city, suburbs, in
a small city or a village, feelings about present income-e.g., living in comfort or coping on
present income. Ideology control includes attitudes towards the left or right-wing political
position. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
17
Table 6: Assortative Mating by Occupational Status and Support for Redis-
tribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All sample Living comfortably Coping on Difficulties with
on present income present income present income
Assortative Mating -0.163 -0.745*** 0.088 0.007
by Occupational Status (0.194) (0.242) (0.272) (0.229)
N 68341 20220 32622 15499
adj. R2 0.084 0.113 0.053 0.035
Country and year FE yes yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes yes
Individual controls yes yes yes yes
Ideology controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: The OLS estimation includes country fixed effects and year fixed effects, regional
controls, individual controls and ideology controls (see the notes of Table 5 for details).
The independent variable is assortative mating in terms of occupation at the regional
level. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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is only significant for this sub-sample. In contrast, results in the lower panel
show that segregation of individuals at the top of the education ladder is not
affecting preferences for redistribution of individuals.
In Table 8, we report the results when using assortative mating at the top
and the bottom occupation level. According to the skill level classification,
the top occupations are the managers and professionals (ISCO-08 codes 1 and
2) whereas the occupations at the bottom are the elementary occupations
(ISCO-08 code 9). In this case, the coefficient of assortative mating by top
occupations is negative and significant for the whole sample. As before, this
result is driven by the wealthiest sub-sample of individuals. In contrast, when
the assortative mating is computed as bottom versus other occupations, the
coefficient is insignificant for all sub-samples.
The rest of the results are consistent with the existing literature. Table
A1 in the Appendix presents the coefficients for the individual characteristics.
Being native-born is positively associated with the demand for redistribution.
Highly educated individuals are less likely to demand redistribution. The lit-
erature explains this significant and negative coefficient with prospects for
upward mobility. Individuals invest more in education to have upward mo-
bility in the future. We also find that men are more inclined to disapprove of
redistribution than women. Compared to employed individuals, retired and
unemployed individuals are more likely to support shared prosperity, whereas
students are averse to it. Furthermore, individuals who live in a small city
or a village tend to vote for more redistribution than individuals living in a
big city. Ideologically, left-wing individuals are more likely to be egalitari-
ans. Accordingly, they are more inclined to embrace the government’s role in
reducing income inequality than right-wing individuals. Finally, we use the
individuals’ perception of their income level as a proxy for income. The more
individuals consider that their current income is not sufficient for living, the
more they tend to support redistribution.
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Table 7: Assortative Mating by Top and Bottom Educational Degree and
Support for Redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All sample Living comfortably Coping on Difficulties with
on present income present income present income
Assortative Mating by -0.566** -1.514*** -0.021 -0.304
Less than Primary Educ (0.240) (0.361) (0.353) (0.340)
N 56119 15660 26736 13723
adj. R2 0.085 0.118 0.054 0.034
Assortative Mating by -0.644 -0.703 -0.637 -0.946
Tertiary Degree (0.395) (0.506) (0.560) (0.591)
N 68341 20220 32622 15499
adj. R2 0.084 0.113 0.054 0.036
Country and year FE yes yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes yes
Individual controls yes yes yes yes
Ideology controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: The OLS estimation includes country fixed effects and year fixed effects, regional
controls, individual controls and ideology controls (see the notes of Table 5 for details).
In the upper panel of the table, we compute assortative mating in terms of having a
completed educational degree. In the lower panel, assortative mating is measured by
having a completed tertiary degree. The value of assortative mating by degree is 1 in
Austria and Ireland because all individuals completed at least a primary degree education.
Therefore, the sample does not include the countries Austria and Ireland in the first
estimation. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. ∗ p <
0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Assortative Mating by Top and Bottom Occupations and Support
for Redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All sample Living comfortably Coping on Difficulties with
on present income present income present income
Assortative Mating by -0.571* -0.908** -0.265 -0.569
Top Occupations (0.288) (0.384) (0.415) (0.409)
N 68341 20220 32622 15499
adj. R2 0.084 0.113 0.054 0.035
Assortative Mating by 0.008 -0.624 0.186 0.306
Bottom Occupations (0.256) (0.456) (0.327) (0.354)
N 68341 20220 32622 15499
adj. R2 0.084 0.113 0.054 0.035
Country and year FE yes yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes yes
Individual controls yes yes yes yes
Ideology controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: The OLS estimation includes country fixed effects and year fixed effects, regional
controls, individual controls and ideology controls (see the notes of Table 5 for details).
The first regression includes the main independent variable of assortative mating by the top
occupations that are managers and professionals (ISCO-08 codes 1 and 2). In the second
estimation, the main independent variable is assortative mating by bottom occupations
that are elementary occupations (ISCO-08 code 9). Robust standard errors clustered at
the regional level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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4.2 Robustness and placebo exercise
We perform a robustness exercise by using an alternative variable measuring
preferences for redistribution. We use the information on to which extent
the respondents agree or disagree with the following statements: ”Large dif-
ferences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts”, ”For fair
society, differences in standard of living should be small”, and ”Social ser-
vices cost businesses too much in taxes”, which are available in the special
modules on welfare attitudes from the waves 2008 and 2016 of the ESS. We
perform a principal component analysis (PCA) using these variables and our
previous measure of preferences for redistribution, which was based on the
statement: ”The government should take measures to reduce differences in
income levels”. We take the first component of the PCA as an alternative
measure of preferences for redistribution.
We then redo the previous analysis with this new measure as the depen-
dent variable. Results are reported in Table A2 in the Appendix. Although
the sample size is smaller (only two waves are used in this analysis), results
are similar to the ones found in the main analysis. The negative relation-
ship between segregation and preferences for redistribution is confirmed when
segregation is measured as assortative mating by occupation, as well as as-
sortative mating in bottom education and top occupation levels. Moreover,
these results are driven by the affluent individuals sub-sample. Only the
assortative mating by education does not come significant. Note also that,
unlike the previous results, individuals who cope with their present income
are likely to demand less redistribution when assortative mating is computed
in terms of having less than a primary degree.
For the last part of the analysis, we run a placebo test. We use survey
questions from the ESS that we believe should not be affected by segregation.
In particular we use respondents’ opinions about the importance to care for
nature and environment, to be humble and modest, and to think new ideas
and being creative. We redo the previous analysis using these dependent
variables separately. If we found some significant effect, then the previous
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results on preferences for redistribution could be spurious. Results are re-
ported in table A3 in the Appendix. The different measures of assortative
mating have no significant effect on any of the previous variables as expected.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows that segregation and preferences for redistribution are neg-
atively related. The incidence of assortative mating in terms of education
and occupation is used as a proxy to measure socioeconomic segregation in
a region. Increased segregation in most forms of assortative mating leads
the affluent to support less redistribution. These results are consistent with
the paper of Bjorvatn and Cappelen (2003), who argue that in a segregated
society with large inequalities in pre-tax income distribution, the affluent be-
come more detached from the other groups in the society and are less keen
on supporting the redistributive policies.
23
A Appendix
Table A1: Individual Characteristics
Educational Occupational












Secondary Education -0.005 -0.005
(0.016) (0.016)








Other activities -0.034** -0.034**
(0.016) (0.016)
Continued on next page...
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Table A1 (continued): Individual Characteristics
Educational Occupational
Household size 0.000 0.000
(0.005) (0.006)
Suburbs of big city 0.043 0.043
(0.028) (0.028)




Coping on present income 0.209*** 0.208***
(0.020) (0.020)
Difficult on present income 0.341*** 0.341***
(0.026) (0.026)
Political Ideology -0.064*** -0.063***
(0.007) (0.007)
Gdp per capita -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.003
(0.005) (0.005)
Tertiary education attainment 0.006* 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003)





adj. R2 0.084 0.084
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A2: Index of Welfare Attitudes
Dependent variable:
Index of Welfare Attitudes
All sample Living comfortably Coping on Difficulties with
Independent variable: on present income present income present income
Assortative Mating by Education -0.403 -0.605 -0.554 -0.194
(0.322) (0.519) (0.335) (0.534)
Ass. Mating by Less than Primary -1.197*** -1.383* -1.000* -1.096
(0.423) (0.817) (0.527) (0.910)
Assortative Mating by Tertiary Degree -0.404 -0.261 -0.891 0.658
(-0.77) (-0.30) (-1.25) (0.50)
Assortative Mating by Occupation -0.857** -1.784*** -0.533 -0.476
(0.334) (0.484) (0.374) (0.756)
Continued on next page...
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Table A2 (continued): Index of Welfare Attitudes
Dependent variable:
Index of Welfare Attitudes
All sample Living comfortably Coping on Difficulties with
Independent variable: on present income present income present income
Assortative Mating by Top Occupations -1.279* -2.695*** -0.766 -0.344
(0.673) (0.944) (0.728) (1.470)
Assortative Mating by Bottom Occupations 0.120 0.258 0.145 -0.196
(0.41) (0.43) (0.35) (-0.42)
N 16326 4888 7918 3520
Country and year FE yes yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes yes
Individual controls yes yes yes yes
Ideology controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: The OLS estimations are made separately for each assortative mating variable. The dependent variable is
constructed as a composite index of attitudes as the first component of a principal component analysis. For this index, the
special modules on welfare attitudes from the rounds of 2008 and 2016 of ESS have been used. The rounds inquire in which
extent the respondents agree or disagree with the following statements:”The government should take measures to reduce
differences in income levels”, ”Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts”, ”For fair society,
differences in standard of living should be small”, and ”Social services cost businesses too much in taxes”. Robust standard
errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table A3: Placebo Test
Dependent variable:
Important to care for environment All sample Living comfortably Coping on Difficulties with
on present income present income present income
Assortative Mating by Education 0.136 -0.086 0.235 0.108
(0.152) (0.213) (0.196) (0.225)
Assortative Mating by Occupation -0.032 -0.043 -0.067 -0.023
(0.199) (0.215) (0.256) (0.286)
N 66362 19458 31719 15185
Dependent variable:
Important to be humble and modest, not draw attention
Assortative Mating by Education -0.022 -0.139 -0.065 0.300
(0.221) (0.313) (0.240) (0.247)
Assortative Mating by Occupation -0.027 0.201 -0.166 0.056
(0.307) (0.457) (0.346) (0.343)
N 66296 19431 31686 15179
Continued on next page...
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Table A3 (continued): Placebo Test
Dependent variable:
Important to think new ideas, being creative All sample Living comfortably Coping on Difficulties with
on present income present income present income
Assortative Mating by Education -0.077 -0.411 0.071 -0.028
(0.182) (0.264) (0.226) (0.274)
Assortative Mating by Occupation -0.260 -0.499 -0.094 -0.180
(0.234) (0.303) (0.333) (0.413)
N 66371 19469 31726 15176
Country and year FE yes yes yes yes
Regional controls yes yes yes yes
Individual controls yes yes yes yes
Ideology controls yes yes yes yes
Notes: The OLS estimations are made separately for each assortative mating variable. Regressions include country fixed effects and
year fixed effects, regional controls, individual controls and ideology controls (see the notes of Table 5 for details). Robust standard
errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
29
References
Alesina, A. and G.-M. Angeletos (2005): “Fairness and Redistribu-
tion,” American Economic Review, 95, 960–980.
Alesina, A. and N. Fuchs-Schündeln (2007): “Goodbye Lenin (or
Not?): The Effect of Communism on People’s Preferences,” American Eco-
nomic Review, 97, 1507–1528.
Alesina, A. and P. Giuliano (2011): “Chapter 4 - Preferences for Redis-
tribution,” in Handbook of Social Economics, ed. by J. Benhabib, A. Bisin,
and M. O. Jackson, North-Holland, vol. 1, 93 – 131.
Alesina, A., E. Glaeser, and E. L. Glaeser (2004): Fighting poverty
in the US and Europe: A world of difference, Oxford University Press.
Alesina, A. and E. La Ferrara (2005): “Preferences for redistribution
in the land of opportunities,” Journal of Public Economics, 89, 897 – 931.
Alesina, A., S. Stantcheva, and E. Teso (2018): “Intergenerational
Mobility and Preferences for Redistribution,” American Economic Review,
108, 521–54.
Benabou, R. and E. A. Ok (2001): “Social Mobility and the Demand
for Redistribution: The Poum Hypothesis*,” The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 116, 447–487.
Bjorvatn, K. and A. Cappelen (2003): “Inequality, segregation, and
redistribution,” Journal of Public Economics, 87, 1657 – 1679.
Blossfeld, H.-P. (2009): “Educational Assortative Marriage in Compar-
ative Perspective,” Annual Review of Sociology, 35, 513–530.
Borge, L.-E. and J. Rattsø (2004): “Income distribution and tax struc-
ture: Empirical test of the Meltzer–Richard hypothesis,” European Eco-
nomic Review, 48, 805 – 826.
30
Bruch, E. and R. Mare (2009): “Segregation dynamics,” in The Oxford
handbook of analytical sociology, ed. by P. Bearman and P. Hedström,
Oxford University Press.
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